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The school of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) has developed a theoretical framework for 
comparative analysis, which is used for studying developed national economies. The authors 
consider it sociological evident that different institutional areas and subsystems (product 
markets, the labour market, the financial sector, social protection and the welfare state, and 
the education system) should be studied in order to model the social system of production. 
Besides the creation of the models of capitalism, in these works the question is hidden 
whether capitalism has more competitive models.  
The review of the macroeconomic and econometric studies persuasively prove that the 
institutional areas examined in the most influential works of the VoC literature are all 
relevant with respect to the performance of economy and growth, like their characteristics, 
based on which the different models are typified. At the same time it is instructive that there 
is no unambiguous correlation in the subsystems – especially in the case of the labour 
market, social protection and education – between the institutional system and economic 
growth, and thus there is a scope for economic and socio-political options among the 
different sets of institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalisation and the fall of the Soviet empire have made the question timely of 
whether countries are heading for only one model of capitalism as a result of 
international competition. Both comparative economics and sociology show an 
interest in the different institutional solutions of capitalism. 
The school of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) has developed a theoretical 
framework for comparative analysis, which is used for studying developed national 
economies. Two complex theories have become most influential lately: the works of 
Hall and Soskice (2001) and Amable (2003). 
The classification by Hall and Soskice (2001) has become one of the most 
widespread methodologies in the literature. Their views are in line with approaches 
started in the 1980‟s examining the social system of production, and focusing on the 
behaviour of companies. They deal with the determining sub-systems of the 
economic system: corporate governance and the financial system, industrial 
 Beáta Farkas 20 
relations, education and the training system, the system of inter-company relations 
in terms of market competition and technology transfer. They find that there is 
strong relationship between the type of coordination and the institutions. They 
describe two ideal types of modern capitalism based on the coordination of 
economic activity: the liberal market economy and the coordinated market economy. 
The Mediterranean countries are classified as a separate group within the latter. 
Hall and Gingerich (2004) verified these ideal types empirically using a factor 
analysis while making a supplementary point of naming the Mediterranean countries 
as “mixed” market economies.  
Amable (2003) refers to Hall and Soskice‟s dual division as non-satisfactory 
because fundamental differences remain unexplained. He examines five defining 
institutional areas: product markets, the labour market, the financial sector, social 
protection and the welfare state, and the education system. Based on theoretical 
works, Amable assumes that five models of capitalism exist: market-based, social 
democratic, continental European, Mediterranean and Asian models. He confirms 
the existence of these models by principal component analysis and cluster analysis. 
Among the institutional areas analysed by Hall and Soskice, and Amable there 
is significant overlap as well as difference. Difference occurs in that the former 
approach places great emphasis on the study of business management, while the 
latter disregards it but extends the analysis to social protection and the welfare state. 
However, later both Hall (2007) and Soskice (2007) integrated the welfare state into 
the VoC model. At the same time, both Hall and Soskice (2001) and Amable 
consider it sociological evident that the mentioned institutional areas and subsystems 
should be studied in order to model the social system of production. Besides the 
creation of the models of capitalism, in both works the question is hidden whether 
capitalism has more competitive models. Thus, from my point of view, it should be 
examined whether the chosen subsystems have relevance with respect to the 
performance of the economy. In the following, based on the empirical studies in the 
current literature, we intend to decide on the question of whether the inclusion of the 
named subsystems in the creation of models is reasonable, as well as whether the 
characteristics of the different subsystems defined by different indicators are 
relevant to the performance of the economy and economic growth.  
2. The relationship of competition, productivity and innovation 
In the description of the different models of capitalism, one of the most important 
questions of typology is how strong the competition is and how much it is restricted 
by the state. In theoretical economics – by the mainstream authors – it is a generally 
accepted correlation that strengthening competition and deregulation increase the 
performance of the economy, and pressing back the state‟s intervention has a 
beneficial effect on economic growth. Competition increases the growth of the 
Institutional areas of the market economy and their contribution… 21 
economy by urging innovation, which increases productivity. On the other hand, it 
forces the managers to use the resources better, and to make their allocation more 
efficient. The present article does not wish to analyse the macroeconomical disputes 
in relation to this or to examine which other conditions, such as economic policy or 
institutional conditions, are needed in order to realize the desirable effects of free 
competition. Only a short summary is provided here about the conclusions from the 
current literature. In most writings the topic of competition and growth goes hand in 
hand with the study of research and development and innovation.  
In 2002 Ahn, in 2008 Sharpe and Currie prepared a comprehensive review of 
the relevant literature. Some of the studies about the relationship of competition, 
innovation and growth in productivity are of a theoretical nature; however, usually 
these do not only create models, but also empirically test them. Other studies aim at 
the comparison of international experiences. The most significant work is conducted 
in the framework of the OECD, and materials prepared here include proposals on 
reform of the economic policy. The third type of approach is the case study. 
Through both literature reviews it can be seen that empirical evidence asserts the 
notion that the intensity of competition has a positive effect on innovation and 
productivity.  
Conway et al (2006) has observed that in the 1990s in OECD member states 
governments conducted wide liberalization, in spite of which differences in 
productivity still increased among the countries. Their explanation is that still after 
the liberalization significant differences remained in the market regulation. In the 
1990s new, general-purpose technologies (information, communication 
technologies) appeared and it was partially determined by the market regulation how 
this “productivity shock” could spread in the economy. At the same time they call 
attention to the fact that in order to interpret the changes in productivity, apart from 
the institutions related to market regulation, also the labour market, the financial 
market and education should be examined. Høj et al (2007) have found evidence in 
OECD member states, while analysing the correlation of profit margin and market 
regulation, that liberalization increases the strength of competition. Based on this 
they make economic policy recommendations to strengthen competition in the field 
of services. Dutz and Hayri (2000) conducted examinations of the different areas of 
the world economy which in sum have shown a tight correlation between long-term 
growth and effective competition policy. However, data on the area of the Far East 
show a much weaker relationship, owing to which the authors warn against further 
simplification. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) also argue for the deregulation of the 
market, but they provide conditions with respect to both the product and the labour 
market which are needed for generating growth by deregulation.  
A unique line of argument stems from the theory of Schumpeter, which, in 
contrast to the above-mentioned, supposes that competition decreases the motivation 
for innovation, because prospects of the rent originating from innovation decline 
owing to the strong competition. A series of studies have come to light in the 
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National Bureau of Economic Research in which the Schumpeterian-effect is 
combined with the case of competition motivating innovation. Acemoglu et al 
(2002) distinguish investment-based development strategies from innovation-based. 
The former had been successfully applied by emerging countries, where intervention 
from the state, direct assistance and the restriction of competition might have their 
place. In the case of innovation-based growth, the role of competition, the selection 
of successful firms and managers increases close to technology frontiers. There is a 
risk that following the fruitful closing up, the economy does not switch to 
innovation-based development, which is required for further growth. Interest groups 
gaining strength in the period of investment-based development might also acquire 
political influence and thus be able to hinder the switch-over to innovation-based 
development. Aghion et al (2005) describe the relationship of competition and 
innovation with a reversed U-shape curve. In their model, innovation takes place 
step by step. Innovation is not motivated mostly by the innovation rent in itself, but 
by the difference between the preinnovation and postinnovation rent. If the starting 
level of competition is low and the technical level is balanced in most of the sectors, 
then an increase in competition motivates innovation because companies can 
“escape” competition. If competition is already fierce and the technical level in most 
of the sectors is unbalanced, then for the less-developed firms there is no motivation 
for innovation, the obtainable innovation rent is small, and thus the Schumpeterian-
effect emerges. In industries where the firms are technologically close to the 
frontier, strong competition urges innovation (so the “escape-competition” effect 
dominates). With the assistance of British data, the authors find their model 
empirically proven. Kilponen and Santavirta (2007), grounded upon Finnish 
experience and data, highlight the reversed U-shape relationship of innovation and 
competition. They also examined the effect of R&D subsidies. They have reached 
the conclusion that R&D subsidies accelerated innovation at all levels of 
competition, but by competition becoming more intense, the positive effect 
decreased. Thus when the Schumpeterian-effect occurred, it was intensified by R&D 
subsidies.  
Amable et al (2008) – after a thorough examination of the relevant literature – 
have defined different correlations with an empirical background. It is precisely the 
high-tech area where regulation of the product market helps innovation, while 
competition has a positive effect in the underdeveloped industries, so the 
Schumpeterian effect prevails. Through an analysis of the role of the public sector, 
they draw the conclusion that competition policy cannot substitute science and 
technology policy. 
With respect to the analysis of the product markets the relationship of 
competition, productivity and innovation has been demonstrated so far. Apart from 
the above-mentioned, privileged role of innovation, it is highlighted by the 
significance of technological development, which is shown in current growth 
theories. In the neoclassical growth models of the 1950s and 1960s, technological 
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development was seen as an exogenous factor and by taking it into account, a long-
term positive rate of economic growth could be presumed. Since the source of the 
long-term growth was an element outside the model, in the end, long-term growth 
itself remained without explanation. This defect was remedied by the endogenous 
growth theory, which has resulted in further problems. The results of technological 
development are manifested in such goods that are partly non-competing and have 
certain characteristics of public goods. If the non-competing new notions are 
included in the factors of production, returns to size might be increasing, which does 
not fit perfect competition. Theories of research and development and imperfect 
competition had been involved in growth theories since the end of the 1980s. In 
these models, technological development is the result of deliberate research and 
development, the reward of which is some form of ex post monopoly – following 
Schumpeter. In the opinion of Barro (2005) the long-term growth rate depends on 
such governmental actions, like taxation, the maintenance of legality and public 
order, the provision of infrastructural services, the protection of intellectual 
property, international trade, and the regulation of financial markets and other areas 
of the economy. In the mentioned work of Barro, the development of growth 
theories is described, especially the contribution of Romer, Lucas, Aghion and 
Howitt and others to endogenous growth theory. The topic‟s detailed and classic 
elaboration can be found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin‟s (2004) book. 
All in all, we can see that it is both theoretically and empirically proven that 
competition increases the performance of the economy. This seems to be sustainable 
even if researchers sometimes point out contradictions as well as institutional 
conditions. Thus we can accept the regular aspects of the VoC literature with respect 
to analysis of the product markets, the strength of competition and presence of the 
state. Innovation and the privileged importance of technological development also 
justify that research and development and innovation should be treated as an 
independent subsystem in the comparative institutional examinations.  
3. The effect of the financial system on economic growth 
The main question of the VoC literature when analysing the financial system is 
whether financing takes place primarily through the banking system or the financial 
market. Out of the chosen two foundational works, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
expressly stress this, while Amable (2003) highlights that owing to the changes in 
the 1990s, financial systems form the combination of the two.  
Nevertheless, in the literature the question arises of what effect the 
development of the financial systems has on economic growth. About the 
relationship of competition and growth in case of the product markets, widespread 
agreement can be seen, along with some adjusting and refining. Similar agreement is 
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not so visible about the effect of the development of the financial system on long-
term growth.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) provide a thorough review about the 
ongoing theoretical disputes. It is demonstrated that some of the works (e.g. well-
known books on development economics) do not deal with the financial system, 
while others consider it evident that the financial system is important in relation to 
growth. Those authors, who give a positive role to the financial system, argue that 
its efficient functioning decreases information and transaction costs. It not only 
helps the efficient allocation of capital, but exercises control during the realization 
of the investment. Diversification of risks, mobilisation and collection of savings, 
and ease of transactions all have a beneficial effect on economic growth. According 
to Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008), empirical research, which they summarize, 
has a more direct message. In these they aim at measuring the relationship of the 
development of the financial system and economic growth, comparing not only at 
the level of countries, but industries and corporations. Numerous studies – several of 
them prepared by the World Bank and the National Bureau of Economic Research – 
prove that the depth of the financial system correlates with per capita long-term 
growth, accumulation of capital and growth in productivity. In the analyses they 
aimed at proving that not simultaneity bias caused these results, but there is causality 
between them, and the authors excluded other possibly influential factors (e.g. per 
capita income, education, political stability, etc.). 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) note that their conclusions should be 
treated with reservations in spite of the evidence found. It seems to be a valid 
critique, for example, that with the econometrical approaches, development of the 
financial system can only be measured quantitatively, which does not say anything 
about how the banks, when lending, fulfil the task of searching for information 
which helps the effective allocation of capital. The case of China can only be 
included in their theory with difficulty.  
We are warned, for example, by the critique of Zhu et al (2004) about the 
often-quoted article of Levine and Zervos (1998). The latter proved, by using data 
from 47 states between 1976 and 1993, that the developed money market measured 
by stock exchange liquidity, and the developed bank system measured by bank loans 
to private enterprises divided by GDP significantly and positively affect the growth 
of GDP. Zhu et al (2004) demonstrate that the authors reached their conclusions 
about the role of stock the exchange by excluding the outliers, which, when taken 
into account, would rule out the conclusions of the article.  
There‟s an extensive literature dealing with how decisive the role of legal 
institutions is in the development of the financial system. It can hardly be disputed 
that the former has an effect on the latter, but opinions vary about its importance. 
About the ongoing dispute a comprehensive picture is drawn by Beck and Levine 
(2003). 
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Taking into account all methodological barriers and counterarguments, we can 
accept that the development of a financial system is an important characteristic of 
an economic model, and at the same time it forecasts the possibilities of 
development. Thus in institutional analysis apart from the dichotomy of financing 
through bank or stock exchange, the development of the financial system itself 
should also be studied.  
4. Institutions of the labour market and the performance of the labour market 
As a criterion enabling differentiation between the liberal and the coordinated 
market economy, Hall and Soskice (2001) used the method of organizing 
employment, which is based on unique contracts in the case of the former, while in 
the latter it is based on the collective contracts negotiated by the organizations of 
employers and employees. Amable (2003) distinguished three aspects of the 
institutions of the labour market. Flexibility of the labour market was measured by 
the employment protection legislation, and analysis of the institutional system of 
labour relations as well as the instruments used by employment policy took place.  
It is well-known that since the middle of the 1970s, the member states of the 
European integration have been hit by a high level of unemployment. A historical 
review is given by Cameron (2001) about this and the differences among the 
member states. The conclusion that was reached is that the employment rate was 
higher in those member states where economic growth was higher, the organizations 
of the employers and employees made new, more flexible contracts, and the 
government carried on an economic policy that aimed at creating jobs. It has become 
a general belief that making the labour market more flexible is essential for creating 
jobs in a growing number. According to a study of the European Central Bank 
(2008), participation in the labour market can be increased by making the labour 
market more flexible, fitting the demand and supply in the Eurozone. In the 
empirically-founded studies after the millennium it is not the verification of this 
connection that is in the centre, but the relationship of the deregulation of the labour 
market and the product market. In this topic – like in the product market – the 
intellectual influence of the research groups of the OECD is determinative. This is 
where the indicators are created and measured which are usually used in the 
literature. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) – partially building on the above-
mentioned theoretical model of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), and partially 
developing further the empirical analysis conducted previously with Boeri (Boeri et 
al 2000) – examine the relationship of the reforms of the product market and 
employment in the OECD member states. They provide a comprehensive review of 
the results of the literature, according to which, based on the theoretical models 
dealing with the regulation of the product market, it can be presumed that regulation 
restricting competition entails a loss in employment. Empirical analysis has proved 
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this presumption. Many studies confirm that high a tax wedge and high and long-
lasting unemployment benefits have negative effect on employment. The situation is 
not exactly clear with respect to employment protection legislation. Security of the 
workplace and stable work relations can increase the employee‟s intention to 
cooperate, which can increase productivity. However, very rigid regulation can lead 
to a lower level of employment. Opinions vary about the relationship between 
employment legislation and the institutional system of collective bargaining and its 
level of centralization. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) ground their analysis of the 
experience of OECD member states on data between 1980 and 2002. They have 
reached the conclusion that the trend of the employment rate can be partially 
explained by the differences of the legislation on the labour and product market. The 
restriction of competition had significantly diminished the employment rate in the 
OECD countries. With respect to employment, the anti-competition legislation was 
the most costly where the labour market policies and institutions protected people 
within the labour market and increased their power to negotiate. The positive effect 
of deregulation on long-term employment stems from, on the one hand, the higher 
activity levels and new firm entry, and, on the other hand, the shrinking wage-
productivity gaps as insiders lose their leverage on rents. (In the short term, as it was 
pointed out by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), the increase of competition can lead 
to a decrease in employment at incumbent firms.) It has also been stated that 
deregulation of rigid markets leads to greater advantages. It is an interesting partial 
result that only a slight decrease occurred in employment gains when the tax wedge 
was reduced and the employment protection legislation was loosened up, but the 
generous employment benefit remained unchanged (this is the Danish system of 
“flexicurity”). Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) have warned that the available data is 
limited and further research is needed. Results should be treated carefully. For 
example Berger and Danninger (2006) found that the deregulation of the market 
leads to a significant increase in employment, but from their point of view, 
deregulation of the product market is more efficient when labour market policies are 
less restrictive. Fiori et al (2008) confirm the analysis of Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
(2005) with respect to the disputed question. 
The research group of Amable–Lung (2008) has reached different results by 
using the same OECD data. Their opinion is also that restriction of competition at 
the product market and the high-level organization of trade unions undermine 
employment, but the employment protection legislation does not. In their 
explanation, that occurs because in the deregulated labour market the unstable 
situation of the employees can be balanced by higher wages in order to keep their 
motivation, which reduces employment.  
The study of Boeri (2005) highlights why one finds more complex 
institutional solutions and less clear-cut results in the examination of the labour 
market than in the product market. Valuation of the European structural reforms of 
two decades showed that reforms of the labour market had been more frequent than 
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those of the product market, although the latter had been more coherent. In the case 
of the labour market, reforms can be introduced more gradually, first being applied 
only to the newcomers, which is politically more accomplishable. This graduality is 
unachievable in the product market because the incumbent firms could drive away 
the newcomers owing to their more advantageous state. 
Besides deregulation of the labour market, an active employment policy is the 
other instrument with which they intend to step up both at EU and national level 
against the persistent high rate of European unemployment. A study covering five 
European states examined the effect of an active employment policy. The summary 
study and the case studies on the states all show that active an employment policy 
helps to reduce unemployment as well as persistent unemployment, but with 
relatively small efficiency (De Koning–Mosley 2001); thus, the realization of the 
programs requires development. 
Based on the above it is certain that employment, with respect to the 
performance of labour markets, the flexibility of the labour market, labour relations 
and employment policy are all significantly influential factors; thus, it is reasonable 
to base the formation of the clusters upon them. At the same time we were struck 
that the authors‟ choice of values and world view in the analysis is more visible 
when compared to the previously analyzed subsystems, and the results are more 
controversial.  
5. The welfare state and social protection 
It was not easy to summarize concisely with respect to the above-mentioned 
subsystems what theoretical background and empirical results are given by 
macroeconomics and econometrics for the comparative analysis of economies. The 
welfare state, the subject of social protection, poses a task which is more difficult 
than this. 
It has already been obvious about the labour market that the examination of 
economic correlations inevitably touches upon sensitive sociopolitical issues. The 
subject of the welfare state is the terrain of not only the economist, but the 
sociologist and political scientist too. It cannot even be attempted to take a look at 
the disputes ongoing in the different fields of research about the welfare state since it 
would require an independent book.  
Some of the literature dealing with the varieties of capitalism mentions social 
protection, others call it the welfare state, and these terms cannot be precisely 
separated from each other. For example Amable (2003) writes about social 
protection, but compares his own model to the models of Esping-Andersen (1990) 
which in turn constituted welfare-state regimes. We can observe that those 
approaching the subject from the side of sociology, sociopolitics, political science, 
and political economics tend to use the more comprehensive term, that is, the 
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welfare state, while those executing statistical examinations for modelling 
macroeconomics or comparative economics use the term social protection. For a 
macroeconomic analysis, social protection can easily be grasped by welfare 
payments; furthermore the OECD has a well-constructed, defined database.  
The most frequent explanation for the birth of the welfare state, which spread 
in the 1960s and 1970s, originates from functionalist sociology, namely that it is the 
answer for the social challenges and possibilities arising from industrialization. 
Conflict theory attributes it to political factors and social movements. Since the 
economic crisis of the 1970s, criticism has become stronger, and the most urgent 
question is whether the welfare state is sustainable in the era of globalization, in 
postindustrial and at the same time aging societies (Jæger–Kvist 2004, Kleinman 
2002, Tomka 2008). Nevertheless it is a fact that the welfare system has survived all 
challenges as the average level of welfare payments has not decreased either in the 
OECD member states or in the European Union (Arjona et al 2001, Jæger–Kvist 
2004, Tomka 2008).  
Genschel (2004) considers all opinions about the relationship of globalization 
and the welfare state. Globalists declare the crisis of the welfare state and its 
reduction in the frame of a convergence process the direct and necessary 
consequence of internationalization. According to sceptics, nothing proves that 
mutual international interdependencies restrict the autonomy of national politics, as 
the size of the welfare state has not diminished, and differences among nations still 
exist. A third group, the so-called revisionists even claim that globalization can help 
solving those problems of the welfare state that originate from the welfare state 
itself. The disciplining force of international markets makes it easier for 
governments to keep welfare payments under control, which are susceptible to 
dynamic increase. By taking into account the theoretical arguments and the 
empirical research, it is clear that in the era of globalization, there is not a single 
unambiguous direction for the welfare state, but there are choices for governments.  
Numerous macroeconomic models and empirical studies have analyzed the 
relationship of economic growth with social protection and income inequalities. 
Aronja et al (2001), besides creating their own model, processed all the available 
results. The most common argument of economic theories against equality is that the 
amount of savings in an egalitarian society is less, which slows down growth. The 
bigger the difference in income is among the groups of workers, the more people 
there are who aim at receiving those qualifications which secure a high productivity 
job and higher wage. Others mention against inequality that poorer households are 
unable to invest, even from credit, in human capital, which is disadvantageous for 
growth. When great inequalities exist, there might be too many people among the 
voting population who are not interested in the necessary economic reforms which 
strengthen competition. The probable social and political tensions are also not 
beneficial for economic growth. But social protection can harm growth owing to its 
possible effect of deterring people from both saving and working. If a political way 
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of enforcement of interests results in better access to material goods than through 
economic activity, then this can result in the decline of business and innovative 
capacity. The advantage of strong social protection is greater social cohesion in 
which it is easier to make difficult political, economical decisions (e.g. about 
structural adjustment); social groups do not drop out of society, thus neither from 
participation in the labour market, which increases economical potential; and 
children of the poorer also have the chance for long-term social, intellectual 
development.  
Aronja et al (2001) collected 24 such studies from the previous one and a half 
decades which had analyzed the relationship of growth, social inequality and social 
protection. In accordance with these it is not possible to decide which above-
mentioned theory is verified by reality, whether there is a trade-off among growth, 
social protection and equality, or whether the latter assists the former, because the 
studies are controversial. According to their own research based on the database of 
OECD, there‟s no reliable evidence for the relationship between growth and the 
final (after taxes and transfers) distribution of income. However, they found it 
proved that more welfare payment implies lower economic growth, but the active 
payments, which help employment, assist growth.  
After the review of the literature, the conclusion seems to be persuasive that 
different institutional solutions can be economically successful1, for the 
demonstration of which the database describing social protection and its structure 
can be used well. 
6. Education and growth 
Hall and Soskice (2001) have integrated into the types of the liberal and coordinated 
market economies the different systems of vocational training from out of the whole 
system of education because this is necessary for the examination of the system of 
production. In the formal training of the liberal system, students acquire general 
knowledge and abilities, and firms are unwilling to invest in their own training 
because in the flexible labour market those trained by them can easily find another 
job. In the coordinated market economy – which is illustrated by the example of 
                                                   
1 Historical experience shows that there is not necessarily a relationship between the level of welfare 
payments and the institutional structure. On the one hand, market solutions can be relatively costly. In 
2007 the USA spent 16% of the GDP on public health, while for example Finland spent only 8.2%. On 
the other hand, for example, in Sweden universal health care and the pension system exists independent 
from whether 11.3% (1950) or 40.1% (1990) of the GDP is spent on it. They did not give up the 
philosophy of their system of social institutions even when the level of state expenditures was lowered 
from 70% (1994) to 54.4% (2001) compared to the GDP. Thus adjustment of the welfare payments to 
the actual capacity of the economy does not define the institutional structure relevant to it. (Source of 
the data: database of OECDStat, Győrffy 2006, Tomka 2008) 
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Germany – companies provide vocational training, which is supervised by the 
organizations of employers and which gives specific knowledge. 
Amable (2003) mentions that education systems are extremely country-
specific and their comprehensive comparative analysis is missing. Usually the 
education system of Anglo-Saxon countries and of Germany and the Netherlands are 
compared to each other, the former being characterized by loose, while the latter by 
strict standardization and differentiation. Amable used in the analysis a wide range 
of indicators, although he was not able to find reliable and comprehensive data on 
vocational training2. 
According to the neoclassical growth theory, education is one of the 
determinants of the economic environment because education develops human 
capital, which increases the productivity of work, and thus owing to growth 
equilibrium moves to a higher level of output. The endogenous growth theory 
stresses the force of education in increasing innovational capacity, but also has an 
important role in spreading and distributing knowledge. In a series of 
macroeconomic analyses aimed at proving empirically what is expectable under the 
theory, Akram and Pada (2009) studied seven such country-studies and 14 studies 
on multiple countries. The period of time, the group of examined countries, 
segments of education, and the statistical methods used all differed, and the power 
of the results, and the level of their significance also, but they unambiguously 
affirmed that education has a significantly positive effect on the growth of economy. 
Hanushek–Wößmann (2007) point out that usually the studies capture 
education with quantitative criteria (level of enrolment, length of studies, etc.), albeit 
that quality of the education might also have importance with respect to the growth 
of the economy. They used the results of international tests for the evaluation of the 
quality of education, and there were both developed and developing countries 
among the examined ones. Their analysis does not only prove the significantly 
positive effect of quality of the education on the growth of the economy, but also 
that the level of this is relatively low in the closed economies, while much greater in 
the open ones. The economically positive effect of education is increased when 
operated in a productive institutional environment (markets, legal system, etc.). 
They establish that improvement of the education system is not only a monetary 
issue, but that greater input brings results only when combined with concerted 
action. A key element of the reforms is to provide quality teaching staff.  
Empirical studies underline that education has a positive effect on growth. But 
it is striking that when compared to the previous subsystems, the classification of the 
institutional system of education and its correlations with growth are not thoroughly 
elaborated yet.  
                                                   
2 Gangl (2000) considers the dualistic education systems which provide vocation-specific training, like 
the ones in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, advantageous for the young people who 
are entering into the labour market. 
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7. Conclusions 
The review of the macroeconomic and econometric studies persuasively prove that 
the institutional areas examined in the most influential works of the VoC literature 
are all relevant with respect to the performance of economy and growth, like their 
characteristics, based on which the different models are typified. At the same time it 
is instructive that there is no unambiguous correlation in the subsystems – especially 
in the case of the labour market, social protection and education – between the 
institutional system and economic growth, and thus there is a scope for economic 
and socio-political options among the different sets of institutions. 
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